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Abstract: In the experimental auctions literature, it is common practice to train sub-
jects, who are often unfamiliar with the auction procedure, by conducting a few training
(often hypothetical) auctions. Data from these practice auctions are rarely reported in sci-
entific papers. We argue that valuable information can be garnered by looking at data coming
from the training rounds of experimental auctions. As a case study, we use data from an
experiment that seeks to elaborate on the mediating role of mood states on projection bias.
Following a mood induction procedure, subjects are found to bid more under negative mood
(as compared to positive mood) for products that are delivered in the future but bid less
under negative mood for products that are delivered in present time. We show that if we
had neglected insights gained from the training auction data, we would not have been able
to detect a failure of randomization to treatment that rendered us biased estimates of the
true causal effects due to unobserved heterogeneity.
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1 Introduction
The experimental turn that followed mathematical formalization, economic modeling,
and the emergence of econometrics, has been increasingly recognized as an equally important
fourth transformative power in terms of its impact on economics (Svorenc˘´ık, 2015).1
In economic analysis, the ‘ceteris paribus ’ phrase is used whenever we want to isolate an
effect from other influences, that is, whenever we want to give a causal interpretation of an
effect. Experiments are being referred to as the golden standard for causal inference because
through proper experimental designs, they allow holding all other factors constant, so that
the change in the outcome of interest can be associated with changes in the manipulated
factor. The essential features of experimental design —one of the fundamental aspects
of the methods used in experimental economics —are often referred to as “. . . control and
comparison, with randomization [emphasis added] an essential part of control” (Siegel, 1964).
Randomization was popularized in Fisher’s (1925) Statistical methods for research workers,
but dates back even earlier to more than a century ago (Peirce and Jastrow, 1885). The
statistical description and interpretation of a randomized experiment is now commonly called
the Neyman-Rubin model of causal inference due to Neyman (his original work appeared in
Polish in a doctoral thesis submitted to the University of Warsaw; for excerpts reprinted in
English and some commentary see Speed, 1990; Splawa-Neyman et al., 1990; Rubin, 1990)
and Rubin (1974).
Experimental economics bases causal interpretation on the Neyman-Rubin model and the
validity of its assumptions. The Neyman-Rubin model approach to causality, is explained
through a framework of potential outcomes: each unit has two potential outcomes, one if
the unit is treated and another one if it is untreated. A causal effect is defined as the
difference between the two potential outcomes; that is, the response of the same unit under
a treatment and a control condition (the counterfactual). The problem, however, is that
we cannot observe the same unit under both the control and the treatment condition. This
1 This particular opinion expressed in the introduction of Svorenc˘´ık’s (2015) thesis (his monograph pro-
vides the first account of the history of experimental economics), echoes the view of several experimental
economists. For example, Plott (1991) describes the experimental turn as a revolution that would trans-
form economics into an experimental science. Similarly, Guala (2010) describes the experimental turn as
a methodological revolution towards a ‘tool-based’ science “. . . where models, statistics, and mathematics
played the role both of instruments and, crucially, of objects of investigation” in which experiments subse-
quently entered the economists’ toolkit.
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would require to observe the outcome for the same unit in both alternative conditions.
Therefore, one of the potential outcomes will always be missing which is widely known as
the ‘fundamental problem of causal inference’. In social sciences, unlike natural sciences, the
unit changes irreversibly once it is exposed to a treatment and although ‘. . . we may have
the same unit measured on both treatments in two trials [. . . ] we cannot be certain that
the unit’s responses would be identical at both times’ due to carryover or time trend effects
(Rubin, 1974).
Recognizing the inability of the researcher to observe the counterfactual (if it was possible
this would be the ideal experiment), the Neyman-Rubin model infers causality by comparing
the expected outcome of units that received different treatments in order to estimate the
treatment effect. By randomly assigning the treatments, the difference between the experi-
mental and control units is an unbiased estimate of the causal effect that the researcher is
trying to isolate (Rubin, 1974).2 The comparison between two groups of units is valid, how-
ever, only if the two groups have the same expectation in the distribution of all covariates
which are potentially relevant for the treatment outcome. The law of large numbers (LLN)
ensures that by enlarging the sample size, two randomly assigned groups will indeed be
comparable, since the sample average of individual characteristics in larger samples tends to
become closer to the average of the population. However, the need of having a large sample
so that randomization can reduce the differences between the treatment and control groups
is something that experimental economists do not generally pay particular attention to. In
fact, a statistically significant effect coming from a relatively small sample could be valued
more than a statistically significant treatment effect coming from larger samples given that
collecting more data could lead to any consistent statistical test rejecting the null as the
number of observations goes to infinity.
Although by the LLN the more observations collected, the more likely it is that random-
ization will work, a practical decision has to be made as to how many observations would
be needed for it to be considered a large enough sample. This is because studies with large
samples may not be cost effective and are generally more difficult to carry out. Sample size
calculations are increasingly being carried out in experimental studies (e.g., see Drichoutis
et al., 2015, as a showcase in experimental auctions) but these are likely carried out as a
2 Thus, one can think of the Neyman-Rubin model as an approximation to the ideal experiment. As
one reviewer notes, the Neyman-Rubin model stipulates that we cannot obtain unconfounded responses
under both treatment and control for the same individual; which is to say that a treatment effect in a
within-subjects design does not have a causal interpretation under the Neyman-Rubin model. West and
Thoemmes (2010) nicely summarize the additional assumptions needed in the context of the Neyman-Rubin
model, given randomization, to provide a sufficient basis for an unbiased estimate of the magnitude of the
causal effect. Holland (1986) discusses two additional approximations to the ideal design, namely the within-
subjects design and unit homogeneity, and the assumptions behind these approximations (see also footnote
5 in West and Thoemmes, 2010).
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protection against false negatives; that is, experimenters want to make sure they collect as
many observations as needed to detect a given effect size with a pre-specified power; no less,
no more than needed3.
In this study we show that, in the context of experimental auctions, useful information
can be conveyed by looking at the data coming from the training or practice rounds. Ex-
perimental auctions have become a popular tool for applied economists to elicit people’s
willingness to pay (WTP) values due to their demand revealing properties. These auctions
are considered demand revealing because of the (theoretically) incentive compatible nature
of the auction mechanisms. However, experimental auctions are often unfamiliar to subjects.
Consequently, most practitioners agree that employing a training phase prior to the actual
valuation task is essential for subjects to abandon market-like heuristics such as “buying
low” or for demonstrating the incentive compatibility of the auction. This advice is echoed
in Lusk and Shogren’s (2007, pp. 62) experimental auctions book which largely reflects the
established procedure of conducting experimental auctions.4
While preceding an actual auction with practice rounds is common, bids from practice
rounds are rarely recorded. Corrigan et al. (2014) note that a well-known economist said this
about his work on experimental auctions, “I pulled up three old data sets associated with
various published papers. Alas, it seems I did not enter the practice round data (normally
with candy bars) for any of them.” Indeed, it is uncommon in this literature to pay particular
attention to practice/training rounds. Only a handful of papers have done so. For example,
3All statistical hypotheses tests have a probability of making one of two errors: an incorrect rejection of
a true null hypothesis (type I error) representing a false positive; or a failure to reject a false null hypothesis
(type II error) representing a false negative. False positives have received a great deal of attention; academic
journals are less likely to publish null results and p-value hacking makes false positives vastly more likely
(Simmons et al., 2011). Type II errors, on the other hand, have not been given similar attention. In an
attempt to quantify type I errors, Brodeur et al. (2016) analyzed a large number of test statistics (> 50, 000)
published in the American Economic Review, the Journal of Political Economy, and the Quarterly Journal of
Economics between 2005 and 2011 and found a misallocation pattern in the distribution of the test statistics
consistent with inflation bias. That is, researchers inflate the value of almost-rejected tests by choosing a
slightly more “significant” specification which amounts to 10% - 20% among the tests that are marginally
significant. With respect to type II errors, Zhang and Ortmann (2013) reviewed 95 papers published in
Experimental Economics between 2010 and 2012 and found that only one article mentioned statistical power
and sample size issues.
4As one reviewer notes, training rounds may endanger causal interpretation for the same reasons that a
within-subjects design does not establish causality under the Neyman-Rubin model. The potential downside
of training rounds is that training may have some undesirable effect on subjects because by the time subjects
are exposed to the treatment, they may have already changed their behavior due to the training. In the
context of experimental auctions, this could be undesirable if, for example, training induces anchoring.
On the other hand, training could lead to a desirable change in behavior due to learning; for example, to
abandon the ‘buy low’ heuristic. We deliberately abstain from drawing general conclusions about the value
of training in experiments outside the realm of experimental auctions. While a recent study by Roux and
Tho¨ni (2015) contributes to the debate about whether control questions have carry-over effects on oligopoly
market behavior, there are wider issues here that have not garnered much attention in the literature that
warrant further exploration.
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although Drichoutis et al. (2011) did not specifically analyze the bid data from the training
auctions, they found that subjects with extensive training gave significantly higher bids in
the real auctions that followed the practice rounds than minimally trained subjects. In
another study, Corrigan et al. (2014) examined the relationship between practice and real
bids from two auction experiments where participants bid on homegrown-value goods. They
found a positive correlation between practice and real bids but that this was mitigated by
repetition. In addition, the reporting and analysis of practice rounds (in the context of a
BDM mechanism) was a key issue of contention between Plott and Zeiler (2005) and Isoni
et al. (2010)5.
In this paper we use data from our study on projection bias in the context of experimental
auctions6. We opted to look at the mediating effect of induced mood states on subjects’
WTP for some products at three different delivery dates7: i) in present time (right after
5Plott and Zeiler (2005) offered a different interpretation than what has been frequently reported in the
literature of the disparity between the willingness to accept (WTA) and willingness to pay (WTP) measures
by showing that “. . . observed gaps are symptomatic of subjects’ misconceptions about the nature of the
experimental task” and that “the differences reported in the literature reflect differences in experimental
controls for misconceptions as opposed to differences in the nature of the commodity”. Subsequently, Isoni
et al. (2010) noted that although Plott and Zeiler’s (2005) experiments involved 14 tasks eliciting WTP and
WTA for lotteries and one eliciting WTP or WTA for a mug, Plott and Zeiler’s (2005) paper reports only the
results from the task involving mugs. The exclusion of lottery data was justified on the grounds that these
tasks were used only for training subjects. Isoni et al. (2010) applied Plott and Zeiler’s (2005) elicitation
procedure to both mugs and lotteries and found no significant WTP-WTA gap for mugs. However, they
observed a significant and persistent gap for lotteries of the same kind found in Plott and Zeiler’s (2005)
unreported lottery data. Plott and Zeiler (2011) then argued that properties of the goods, such as the
randomness associated with lotteries, might carry an inherent possibility of misconceptions, which might
lead to gaps like those observed in Plott and Zeiler (2005) and Isoni et al. (2010).
6Loewenstein et al. (2003) coined the term “projection bias” to describe the general bias that has been
documented in relation to the prediction of future tastes and particularly to describe people’s assumption that
tastes or preferences will remain the same over time. Quoting from Loewenstein et al. (2003), projection bias
is “. . . a general bias in the prediction of future tastes: people tend to understand qualitatively the directions
in which their tastes will change, but systematically underestimate the magnitudes of these changes. Hence,
they tend to exaggerate the degree to which their future tastes will resemble their current tastes.”
Experimental auctions have increasingly been used as a method to reveal subjects’ preferences for market
and non-market goods, where preferences are defined in monetary terms by values. As such, auctions are
value elicitation methods that put people in an active (constructed) market environment. Valuations are
elicited for use in cost-benefit analysis and to estimate welfare effects. Recently, Briz et al. (2015) studied the
role of projection bias in experimental auctions by examining the bidding behavior of hungry and non-hungry
subjects. They found that the difference in bids between a hot state (hunger) and a cold state (satiation)
almost doubled when subjects had to predict their future tastes. Subjects who had to predict their future
willingness to pay from their current tastes, tended to over-predict their hunger and under-predict satiation.
7The interplay of projection bias and mood is implied by affective forecasting, a process that describes
the prediction of one’s affect in the future (Wilson and Gilbert, 2003). Affective forecasting errors are
closely related to several cognitive biases; one of these being projection bias. Projection bias can arise
when ‘. . . people attempt to come up with an unbiased estimate of what their affective state will be in the
future, but their assessment is contaminated by unique influences on their current well-known affective state’
(Wilson and Gilbert, 2003). That is, projection bias occurs because individuals mispredict the present and
future states of affective forecasting that differ in terms of physical arousal. The reason why this is of interest
to economists is because projection bias implies a violation of utility maximization since the utility derived
from future consumption is influenced by the affective state at the moment of choice (Kahneman and Thaler,
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the auction), ii) one week later and before typical lunch time, and iii) one week later and
after typical lunch time. We used two different types of products, a ham-cheese sandwich for
which craving at lunch time is relevant and a ballpoint pen for which craving during lunch
hours should not be relevant. Our results show that mood states actually mediate the effect
of projection bias on subjects’ WTP. However, a more careful look at the data coming from
the training rounds indicates the presence of a similar effect for a set of (different) products
used in the training rounds. Given that mood was induced only after the training rounds,
we conclude that the effect we observe is not due to treatment assignment; that is, the
treatment manipulation does not cause the difference we observe, which renders the received
estimates as biased estimates of the true causal effects due to unobserved heterogeneity.
Therefore, if data from the training rounds have not been analyzed, our study would have
falsely attributed the difference in bids to the treatments.
Our results are worrying and troublesome because experimental economists do not often
worry about causality since subjects are randomized into treatment and control groups. A
treatment is then administered and any observed difference between the responses from those
groups typically receives a causal treatment-response interpretation. Our per treatment sam-
ple size is typical for auction experiments (see Lee et al., 2011; Lusk et al., 2001; Neugebauer
and Perote, 2007; Olivola and Wang, 2015, for just a few out of numerous examples in the
literature). Moreover, we show that sample size calculations bound detectable effect sizes in
the range of the actual effects we observe. Hence, without examining data from the training
rounds, it would have been impossible to suspect failure of randomization. The problem we
identify is as serious as the problem from false positives: failure of randomization can lead
2006). In this respect, Mehra and Sah (2002) note the relation between mood and projection bias: they
study fluctuations in individuals’ subjective parameters (the discount factor and the level of risk-aversion)
due to mood and how subjects project their current mood into what their future sequence of moods will
be. Patrick et al. (2005) provided some preliminary evidence of the interaction of mood and projection bias
by showing that mood has an impact on the evaluation of future events but only when the future event is
valence neutral and not affectively valenced. A few other studies have used cloudcover, as a proxy for mood,
to study the effect of mood at the time of making a decision on future outcomes. Simonsohn (2010) analysed
the enrollment decisions of prospective students who visited a US university in relation to cloudcover on
the day of the visit and found evidence consistent with projection bias (i.e., cloudiness biased upwards the
estimated future utility of attending that university). He explains this finding in terms of induced sadder
mood due to the weather, which made belonging to an academically challenging institution more appealing
and therefore influenced college decisions through memory. More recently, Madeira (2015) studied mental
health care decision making and showed that cloud coverage increased the probability that a patient filled
an antidepressant prescription on appointment day with the physician, which implies that projection bias
interacts with mood in influencing the antidepressant treatment decision. Finally, Busse et al. (2015) find
that the choice to purchase a convertible or a four-wheel-drive is highly dependent on the weather at the
time of purchase in a way that can be explained by projection bias. All in all, there has been a strand of
the literature that implies that mood at the time when making a decision for a future state might have a
significant impact on this decision. This would be consistent with the interaction of mood and projection
bias and has been the main force behind the empirical endeavor of this research project.
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the research community into false avenues and wasted resources8. The next section describes
our experimental design and methods. Section 3 describes our results which showcase our
conclusion of failure of randomization to treatment. We conclude in the last section.
2 Methods
The experiment was carried out in February and March, 2013 at the Universidad
Polite´cnica de Madrid. Announcements on the website of the University had been made a
few weeks before the scheduled sessions. Students also received bulk announcement emails,
sent to their university email accounts. The announcement did not provide specific details
about the experiment, just general information that the experiment was about a study on
consumer behavior. Participants responded with their weekday preferences and were then
randomly assigned to one of the sessions. For each session, exactly eight participants were
assigned with appropriate over-recruitment to account for no-shows.
The experiment consisted of 6 treatments in 24 different sessions (4 sessions/treatment).
In all, 192 students participated in the experiment (8 subjects/session) and each subject
only took part in one session. The experiment involved a 2 (mood inducement)×3 (time
of delivery of the product) between-subjects experimental design. With respect to mood
inducement (described momentarily), half of the subjects were induced to a positive mood
state and the other half were induced to a negative mood state. We also varied the time
of delivery of the auctioned products to test the effect of projection bias. In one third of
the sessions (8 sessions) the product was given right after the auction (control treatment);
in another third of the sessions (8 sessions), the product was given one week later at 1
pm (which is typically considered “before lunch” in the Spanish culture and according to
students’ habits); and in the other third of the sessions (8 sessions), the product was given
one week later at 3 pm (which is typically considered an “after lunch” time). We auctioned
simultaneously one food and one non-food product to test the effect of craving on subjects’
WTP. We would expect a priori that delivering the product before or after lunch time is
relevant for the food item but is not relevant for the non-food item. For the “before lunch”
and “after lunch” future delivery treatments, the highest bidders were given an exchangeable
coupon and were told that a fresh sandwich bought on the delivery date would be available
in the exact same place of the auction site one week later. The place where the auctions
took place is one of the main classroom buildings in the center of campus, just a few meters
from the head office building. In the control sessions, subjects were given the product right
8The problem of false positives is further exacerbated by the fact that researchers not only file-drawer
entire studies but also file-drawer subsets of analyses that produce non-significant results (Simonsohn et al.,
2014). In addition, researchers rarely take the extra step of replicating their original study (for an exception
see Kessler and Meier, 2014).
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after the auction, which is the standard procedure for auctions. The experimental design is
depicted in Table 1.
Table 1: Experimental design
Mood
Negative Positive
Time of delivery
Future at 1 pm 4 sessions × 8 subjects 4 sessions × 8 subjects
Future at 3 pm 4 sessions × 8 subjects 4 sessions × 8 subjects
Present 4 sessions × 8 subjects 4 sessions × 8 subjects
To achieve some variation over hunger levels, we varied the time of the sessions. Half of
the sessions were conducted at 12 pm and half of the sessions were conducted at 1 pm. We
only allowed a one hour difference between scheduled sessions to minimize potential “time
of the day” effects on bidding behavior (Demont et al., 2012, 2013; Hoffman et al., 1993;
Menkhaus et al., 1992; Morawetz et al., 2011). Since we could not fully control subjects’
eating behavior before participating in the auction, we also asked subjects to self-report their
hunger level.
When subjects arrived at the lab they were randomly seated and were assigned a six-digit
participant number. They were told that all their answers were confidential, that answers
would only be used for this specific study and that they would be given e10 at the end of the
session for their participation. We elicited subjects’ WTP using a 2nd price auction (Vickrey,
1961). The experimenter (one of the authors conducted all sessions) carefully explained the
auction mechanism by means of numerical examples that were also projected in a screen.
Subjects then participated in hypothetical practice auctions to familiarize themselves with
the procedure. In this training phase, subjects bid separately for a USB pendrive and a mug
in three repeated rounds. The importance to bid their true value for the goods during the
auction was emphasized to the subjects. At the end of the third round, one of the rounds
and one of the products were chosen randomly as binding. Although subjects knew this
(training) procedure was hypothetical and thus the binding round was not binding at all, we
used this language to mimic as closely as possible the auction procedure of the real rounds.
No information was posted between rounds (Corrigan et al., 2012).
Next, subjects were induced in either a positive mood state or a negative mood state.
To induce subjects into different moods, we exposed them to picture stimuli. The stimuli
consisted of 40 color pictures representing either pleasant or unpleasant scenes. Half of the
subjects were induced to a positive mood state (exposed to pleasant pictures) and the other
half were induced to a negative mood state (exposed to unpleasant pictures). Pictures were
selected from the International Affective Picture System (IAPS) (Lang et al., 2008).9 Each
9The library numbers for IAPS pictures used in this study for positive mood inducement are: 1340,
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one of the pictures was shown for 6 seconds with a 10 second gap in between, in order to let
participants rate their emotional experience on a 5-point Likert scale anchored by a ‘smiley’
face and a ‘frowned’ face (see experimental instructions in Appendix A).
To quantify the mood induction effect, we used the Positive and Negative Affect Scale
(PANAS), developed by Watson et al. (1988). This scale consists of 20 items using 5-point
scales (1 = very slightly/not at all to 5 = extremely). The scale is sub-divided in two 10-item
scales for positive affect (PA) and negative affect (NA). The terms comprising each sub-scale
for negative affect are: afraid, scared, nervous, jittery, irritable, hostile, guilty, ashamed,
upset, distressed; while the terms for positive affect are: active, alert, attentive, determined,
enthusiastic, excited, inspired, interested, proud and strong. We used the Spanish version of
the PANAS scale validated by Robles and Pa´ez (2003).
Following mood induction, we carried out the real (non-hypothetical) auction. The auc-
tioned products were a ballpoint pen and a ham-and-cheese sandwich. Before the auction,
subjects were able to examine visually the auctioned products: a standard black ballpoint
pen, and a non-branded ham-and-cheese packed sandwich. We explained that the auction
procedure was the same as the one used for the practice auction. Depending on treatment
assignment, subjects were told that they would get the product i) right after the auction, ii)
one week later at 1 pm, iii) one week later at 3 pm. In all treatments (including the future
delivery treatments), the highest bidder had to pay the 2nd highest price for the product
that they won right after the auction. Subjects were informed about this policy before they
started bidding. Subjects bid in three repeated rounds with no information being posted in
between rounds. At the end of the third round, one round and one product were chosen as
binding.
At the end of the experiment, subjects signed a participation sheet and were given
e10 (minus the 2nd highest price, if the person was the highest bidder in a binding
round/product). In the present delivery treatment, subjects were also given the product
they paid for, while in the future delivery treatments subjects were given a coupon to be
redeemed a week later.
1440, 1441, 1463, 1630, 1659, 1999, 2035, 2071, 2158, 2224, 2314, 2352, 2391, 2501, 2550, 2791, 4628, 5831,
8496; for negative mood inducement are: 1019, 2053, 2205, 2375, 2455, 2456, 2688, 2700, 2703, 3350, 6212,
6520, 8485, 9040, 9075, 9254, 9332, 9341, 9410, 9560. The pictures in the positive mood treatment generally
depict happy moments in life, happy people, (cute) animals and their interaction with people and cartoon
characters. The pictures in the negative mood treatment depict illness, grief, sorrow, death, starvation,
accidents and pollution.
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3 Results
3.1 Picture stimuli
We first explore whether subjects rated the emotional experience of the picture stimuli
consistently with a priori expectations. Subjects in the positive mood treatment were ex-
posed to a series of 20 pleasant pictures while subjects in the negative mood treatment were
exposed to a series of 20 unpleasant pictures. They were then asked to indicate how each
picture made them feel on a 5-point Likert scale anchored by a ‘smiley’ face and a ‘frowned’
face. We then summed their responses over the 20 pictures.
Figure 1 depicts kernel density estimators of picture evaluation scores by treatment
(present delivery, future delivery at 1 pm, future delivery at 3 pm). Vertical lines depict
median values. It is evident that pleasant pictures were scored lower while unpleasant pic-
tures were scored higher across all treatments. Note that the smiley scale was reversed, so
that a lower score indicates feelings associated with a ‘smiley’ when watching the picture
while a higher score indicates feelings associated with a ‘frown’. A t-test of whether pleas-
ant and unpleasant picture evaluation scores are significantly different in each treatment,
highly reject the null (p-value< 0.001). Similar results are obtained using non-parametric
Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests.
Figure 1: Kernel density estimators of picture evaluation scores by treatment
In addition, pleasant and unpleasant pictures were evaluated similarly across treatments.
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An ANOVA test indicates that evaluation scores for pleasant pictures do not differ across
treatments (F-statistic=1.44, p-value=0.241). The same goes for unpleasant picture eval-
uation scores (F-statistic=2.41, p-value=0.096). We obtain similar results using the non-
parametric Kruskal-Wallis test for pleasant pictures (χ2 = 2.509, p-value=0.285) and for
unpleasant pictures (χ2 = 3.997, p-value=0.135), respectively. Figure B.1 in Appendix B
depicts kernel density estimates of pleasant picture evaluation scores and unpleasant picture
evaluation scores by treatment. The graphs confirm results from the statistical tests above.
In addition, Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests indicate that we cannot reject the null of equality of
distributions of the picture evaluation scores shown in Figure B.1. All in all, results from the
tests above indicate that the set of pleasant pictures corresponded to a pleasant emotional
experience while the set of unpleasant pictures corresponded to an unpleasant emotional
experience.
3.2 Picture stimuli and induced mood
Once we established that subjects perceived pleasant (unpleasant) picture stimuli as
pleasant (unpleasant), the next important question is whether the picture stimuli were ad-
equate in inducing positive and negative mood states. For this purpose, we summed the
individual items of the PANAS scale to form the two sub-scales of positive and negative
affect.
Figure 2 displays kernel density estimates for the positive and negative affect scales. The
top panel corresponds to subjects in the positive mood treatment (these are the subjects
that were exposed to pleasant picture stimuli) while the lower panel corresponds to subjects
in the negative mood treatment (these are the subjects that were exposed to unpleasant
picture stimuli). Vertical lines depict median values. In the positive mood treatment, the
distribution for the positive affect scale is more to the right (indicating higher positive
affect) while the distribution for the negative affect scale is more to the left (indicating lower
negative affect). Thus, it appears that the pleasant picture stimuli are consistent with a gap
in affect scores in the expected direction. Let us now contrast the top panel of Figure 2
with the bottom panel in the same figure. Compared with the positive mood treatment,
positive affect is more to the left (implying lower levels of positive affect), while negative
affect is more to the right (implying higher levels of negative affect). Thus, when comparing
the positive mood and the negative mood treatments, distributions of positive and negative
affect are in the expected directions.
Visual differences in Figure 2 are also confirmed by statistical analysis. A t-test of whether
positive affect scores is different than negative affect scores, highly rejects the null in the
positive mood inducement (p-value<0.001) as well as in the negative mood inducement (p-
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Figure 2: Kernel density estimators of positive and negative affect by mood induction treat-
ment
value=0.021). Results from Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests agree with previous conclusions.
Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests on whether the distributions of positive affect and negative affect
are equal, highly reject the null in all cases. Additionally, one may wonder if induced positive
affect levels are similar in the positive mood treatment and in the negative mood treatment.
The evidence is clear: the t-tests, Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests and Kolmogorov-Smirnov
tests all indicate that the positive affect in the positive mood treatment is statistically
different (and higher) than in the negative mood treatment. The same set of tests show that
the negative affect in the positive mood treatment is statistically different (and lower) than
in the negative mood treatment.
As one reviewer noted, given that our design did not include a neutral mood treatment, all
we can claim is that the degree of positive and negative affect is different across positive and
negative mood treatments but not how a particular treatment changed mood and in what
direction. However, all that matters is that the positive and the negative mood treatments
exhibit affect levels in the expected directions and are different from each other. It is also
important to note that the result pertaining to the positive and negative affect levels being
close in the negative mood treatment, is not surprising given that positive and negative affect
are aspects of mood that co-exist.
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3.3 Bidding behavior
Table 2 shows the mean, standard deviation and median values of bids (pooled over the
three rounds) per product and treatment. The top two panels show the descriptive statistics
for the sandwich and pen products. With respect to the sandwich product, we can see that
subjects under negative mood bid more in both the future delivery treatments while they
bid less in the present delivery treatment (as compared to positive mood).
Table 2: Descriptive statistics of bids per treatment and product
Product Treatment Positive mood Negative mood
Mean SD Median Mean SD Median
Sandwich
Present delivery 1.52 0.77 1.50 1.27 0.66 1.20
Future delivery at 1 pm 1.35 0.67 1.23 1.71 1.15 1.50
Future delivery at 3 pm 0.98 0.84 0.83 1.17 0.85 1.00
Pen
Present delivery 1.05 0.73 1.00 0.82 0.47 0.75
Future delivery at 1 pm 0.82 0.58 0.70 1.25 0.97 1.00
Future delivery at 3 pm 0.75 0.76 0.50 0.74 0.81 0.50
USB pendrive
Present delivery 4.04 2.24 3.00 4.52 2.86 4.00
Future delivery at 1 pm 5.07 3.16 5.00 7.74 5.11 7.00
Future delivery at 3 pm 5.08 3.99 4.00 5.20 3.78 4.00
Mug
Present delivery 2.84 1.72 2.50 2.67 2.09 2.50
Future delivery at 1 pm 2.78 1.73 2.25 4.94 3.89 3.75
Future delivery at 3 pm 2.73 2.30 2.00 3.45 2.34 3.00
Notes: SD stands for standard deviation.
Although the analysis up to now is purely descriptive, a picture starts to emerge. It
looks as if mood states interact with time of delivery of the product which would imply
that some form of interaction between projection bias and mood is at work. Table 3 shows
the results from statistical tests of whether bids (per product and per time of delivery
treatment) differ between positive and negative mood. Three sets of tests are presented: a
t-test, a Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test (WMW), and a Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) equality
of distributions test10. The top two panels of Table 3 show that the difference in bids shown
in Table 2 between the positive and negative mood treatments are statistically significant for
the present and future delivery at 1 pm treatments. This result holds for both the sandwich
and ballpoint pen under all three sets of tests. The statistical tests are not very clear for
the sandwich product in the case of the future delivery at 3 pm treatment since the WMW
test rejects the null only at the 10% level and fails to reject the null with a t-test and KS
10The t-test, the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney and the Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests are meant to be comple-
mentary to each other. The t-test performs a test on the equality of means. The WMW test, tests the
hypothesis that samples are from populations with the same distribution and the KS test, tests the equality
of distributions. The KS test is sensitive to any differences in the two distributions like differences in shape,
spread or median while the WMW test is mostly sensitive to changes in the median.
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test. Thus, for the future delivery at 1 pm we can conclude that there is a significant effect
showing up already in the training rounds.
Table 3: Tests of differences in bids between the mood treatments
Product Treatment t-test
Wilcoxon-
Mann-Whitney
test
Kolmogorov-
Smirnov
test
t z D
Sandwich
Present delivery -2.428∗∗† -2.025∗∗ 0.167
Future delivery at 1 pm 2.605∗∗† 1.776∗ 0.208∗∗†
Future delivery at 3 pm 1.549 1.959∗ 0.156
Pen
Present delivery -2.646∗∗∗† -1.536 0.240∗∗∗‡
Future delivery at 1 pm 3.719∗∗∗‡ 2.794∗∗∗‡ 0.292∗∗∗‡
Future delivery at 3 pm -0.116 -0.327 0.063
USB pendrive
Present delivery 1.300 1.057 0.135
Future delivery at 1 pm 4.357∗∗∗‡ 4.004∗∗∗‡ 0.365∗∗∗‡
Future delivery at 3 pm 0.216 0.586 0.073
Mug
Present delivery -0.628 -1.180 0.115
Future delivery at 1 pm 4.975∗∗∗‡ 4.090∗∗∗‡ 0.260∗∗∗‡
Future delivery at 3 pm 2.150∗∗† 2.596∗∗∗† 0.240∗∗∗‡
Note: * p-value< 0.1, ** p-value< 0.05, *** p-value< 0.01. † indicates cases for which up
to four different multiple test procedures indicate non-credibility of the null hypothesis.
‡ indicates cases for which nine to eleven different multiple test procedures indicate non-
credibility of the null hypothesis.
Given that in Table 3 we test a family of hypotheses for each test statistic, a multiple
comparisons problem arises. It is well known that as the number of comparisons increases,
the probability of an incorrect rejection of a true null hypothesis increases. If all the tests
are mutually independent, then the probability of at least one true null hypothesis being
rejected would equal to 1− (1−α)N where N is the number of hypotheses being tested. For
each test statistic, we perform 12 comparisons (3 treatments×4 products) so that for α = 5%
significance level, the chance of rejecting at least one true hypothesis would be 45.96%. To
account for the multiple comparisons problem, we utilized multiple test procedures in order
to calculate a corrected overall critical p-value such that an individual null hypothesis is con-
sidered to be acceptable only if its corresponding p-value is greater than the corrected overall
critical p-value. Several multiple test procedures for defining an upper confidence bound for
the set of null hypotheses that are true can be used (Newson and the ALSPAC Study Team,
2003, offer an exposition and Stata implementation for eleven different methods). Table 3
indicates all the cases for which the null hypothesis is not credible, that is, their p-values
are lower than the corrected overall critical p-values. Given that we used several methods to
calculate corrected p-values, the table indicates with a dagger (†) cases for which up to four
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different multiple test methods indicate non-credibility of the null hypothesis and a double
dagger (‡) to indicate cases for which nine to eleven different multiple test methods indicate
non-credibility of the null hypothesis11. Thus, visual inspection of Table 3 shows that most
effects remain intact when accounting for multiple hypothesis testing.
At this point, we posit that most empirical researchers would be looking for narrative
arguments to support the claim that there is some form of interaction between mood and
projection bias as well as to explain how the small difference between the pen and sandwich
results (in the future delivery at 3 pm treatment) could be attributed to craving. After all,
the statistical tests look fairly convincing.
The bottom two panels in Table 2 show the descriptive statistics of bids from the practice
rounds for the USB pendrive and mug. Although these are data that researchers usually
discard and (almost) never formally analyze, it is interesting to note that for both products
subjects bid more in the negative mood treatments (as compared to the positive mood
treatments) and future delivery treatments. Note that although we present the descriptive
statistics per treatment for the two practice products, the treatments are irrelevant for the
practice rounds. For one, in the practice rounds the language in the instructions did not
mention any future delivery of the products nor were subjects made aware that there was
a future delivery treatment in the later part of the experiment. Second, mood induction
had not even been applied in the practice rounds nor were subjects made aware that they
were going to be exposed to a series of images as part of a mood induction procedure. The
bottom two panels in Table 3 present the statistical tests for the treatment effects shown in
Table 2. These roughly support the discussion above.
Conceptually, the problem with the results described above is that if a treatment effect
is evident before the treatment is even applied, then the effect is likely not due to the treat-
ment but rather an indication of randomization failure. Hence, we argue that practice rounds
in experimental auctions may convey useful information and so data from practice rounds
should always be analyzed before interpreting the treatment effect as causal. Even though
one could argue that it is not necessary to analyze practice rounds separately since one could
as well perform randomization/balance tests (i.e., checking whether a set of observed covari-
ates is statistically different between the treatment and control) as a test for randomization
failure, it is questionable whether such randomization tests are really meaningful.12,13 Ho
11We utilized the set of multiple test methods listed in Stata’s multproc routine. More details can be
provided by the authors upon request.
12As a reviewer noted, an obvious advantage of analyzing the training round data is that as long as
personal characteristics do not fully determine behavior, we can obtain additional information by looking at
actual training round bidding behavior.
13Such a test can be reported separately for each variable (preferably after correcting for multiple hy-
pothesis testing) or as a joint test (given that a large volume of individual tests increases the probability
of finding at least one being significant). With our data, we fail to reject the null of no difference for
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et al. (2007) categorize such tests under the term ‘the Balance Test Fallacy’. Their main
point is that ‘. . . balance is a characteristic of the observed sample, not some hypothetical
population’ and that ‘the idea that hypotheses tests are useful for checking balance is there-
fore incorrect.’ Mutz and Pemantle (2015) note that randomization is a process rather than
an outcome and that balance tests are neither necessary to detect randomization problems
nor do such tests indicate sufficient evidence of a randomization problem. They conclude
that the process of randomization is either done correctly or not; there is no middle ground.14
Naturally, we can control for observable characteristics in a regression context. Table 4
gender (χ2 = 5.19, p-value=0.393), income level (χ2 = 17.42, p-value=0.294), hunger level (Kruskal-Wallis
χ2 = 8.35, p-value=0.138), liking of ham-cheese sandwiches (χ2 = 24.88, p-value=0.206) and whether sub-
jects had brought lunch with them the day of the experiment (χ2 = 0.62, p-value=0.987) but reject the
null of no difference between treatments for a few observable characteristics such as age (Kruskal-Wallis
χ2 = 26.72, p-value< 0.001) and education level (Fisher’s exact p-value=0.001). A multiple hypothesis test
procedure, similar to what we followed in Table 3, indicates that for age and education we can reject the
null of no credibility of the null hypothesis.
14 As a reviewer has further pushed us in discovering, we found that balancing tests are an issue also widely
discussed in Randomized Control Trials (RCTs) in the medical literature. For example, in the CONSORT
(Consolidated Standards of Reporting Trials) statement, endorsed by prominent medical journals (BMJ,
Lancet etc.), hypothesis testing of imbalance is characterized as superfluous and misleading (Moher et al.,
2010, pp. 17). In the economics literature, Deaton and Cartwright (2016) discuss the pitfalls of balance tests
along the lines we present below.
In statistical notation, one would state the null hypothesis of such tests as H0 : µA = µB where µA and
µB are the population means of two treatment groups. However, the researcher is interested in evaluating
balance in the sample, not in the population where the samples come from; thus, the issue of balance is
entirely for the sample and involves no inference to populations (Ho et al., 2007; Imai et al., 2008). By
design, however, the purpose of hypotheses tests is to use sample information to make an inference about a
population parameter. By these metrics, a balance test is a logical contradiction.
Altman and Dore´ (1990) note that if randomization has been done fairly (that is, the researcher has not
cheated the randomization process in order to favor a treatment; as a side note, Senn (1994) demonstrates
how one could allocate units in a way which favors one treatment over another but which does not lead to
statistically significant imbalance), the null hypothesis is by definition true; so if one insists on using some
statistical test to test for imbalance, we would expect 5% of such comparisons to be significant at the 5%
level. Therefore, one test in twenty should give a significant result just by chance when α = 5%, so when
ten variables are compared (a typical number of covariates in many experimental studies), it is very likely
that none is significant. One should also keep in mind that randomization does not ensure balance but
rather produces random deviations of relative size inversely proportional to the square root of the sample
size (Mutz and Pemantle, 2015). When sample sizes increase, the expected random deviations between the
two groups are reduced, which reflects the greater expected balance between the groups (Senn, 2013).
Significance tests assess the probability that observed baseline differences could have occurred by chance
when, given randomization, we know that any differences are caused by chance (Altman, 1985; Moher et al.,
2010). Imai et al. (2008) advance the view that researchers should check for balance but not with hypotheses
tests. They support the use of quantile-quantile plots that directly compare the empirical distribution of two
variables while Deaton and Cartwright (2016) suggest the use of a distance measure such as the normalized
difference in means (Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009, equation 3). Imbalance in a baseline variable is only
potentially important, if that variable is related to the outcome variable (Altman, 1985). Although there is no
requirement to have baseline balance for valid inferences, the general advice is that even with randomization
to treatment, observed covariates should be taken into account (Senn, 1994, 2013). This advice goes against
the popular practice of not controlling for observable characteristics after the researcher has failed to reject
the null based on balance tests and suggests that results based on unconditional tests should be taken with
a grain of salt.
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shows the results from random effects regressions separately for each product. The regression
model for the sandwich product controls for extra factors that are relevant to the sandwich
product such as hunger level, liking of cheese-ham sandwich in general and whether the
respondent brought lunch with him/her the day of the experiment. What is clear in Table 4
is that there are significant treatment effects consistent with our discussion above which,
however, are also evident for the training products for which the treatments were not even
applied. Note that observable characteristics do not seem to play a significant role since
regression results from models with just the treatment variable produce almost identical
results (see Table 5)15.
Given the importance of practice/training bids, it may be preferable then to examine
these bids in conjunction with the main auction bids. This is not likely to be a problem in
terms of increasing the length of the papers since results from practice auction bids can be
part of an appendix and most journals now offer this option to their prospective authors.
In addition, examining pre-treatment outcomes and the characteristics across treatments is
now a standard practice in field experiments or quasi-experimental work. Nevertheless, we
posit that this is still considered ‘not standard’ for researchers doing laboratory experiments.
One of the main reasons for the use of laboratory experiments is that it allows us to
randomize treatments. Moreover, the combination of having a high degree of control and
greater ability to achieve homogeneity amongst the population studied allows us to have
greater confidence on the unbiasedness of the treatment estimates. Therefore, using training
rounds to detect unobserved heterogeneity may be considered just a second best, since it
would make more sense to increase the number of observations per treatment so that the
law of large numbers ensures that a randomized treatment is really orthogonal to potential
outcomes. As far as we know, however, there is no rule of thumb on the determination
of the optimal number of observations per treatment where the law of large numbers kicks
in. The closest to this concept is sample size calculations that establish conditions under
which it is possible to detect a certain (desirable) effect size with a specified power. As
shown in Appendix C, our per treatment sample size is adequately safe for detecting any
difference between treatments larger than 0.5 but also smaller differences under certain con-
ditions. So the question “how many observations per treatment are required for the law of
large numbers to kick in?” does not have a clear answer. As such, it is difficult to give
15 Although we focus on statistical significant results here, it might be important to consider effect
sizes as well. In Appendix D we present standardized effect sizes as complements to statistical significance
testing. In addition, one can interpret coefficient estimates in terms of predicted WTP in order to get a
sense of proportions. The average predicted WTP for Table 4 is e1.34 for the sandwich, e0.91 for the
pen, e5.27 for the USB and e3.24 for the mug. To illustrate our point, take the coefficient estimate for
‘Future at 1 pm’ variable which happens to be statistically significant for all models listed in Table 4. The
estimated coefficient would correspond to a 46.33% (=0.62/1.34), 49.67% (=0.45/0.91), 60.51% (=3.19/5.27)
and 68.91% =(2.23/3.24) change, respectively, of the average predicted WTP, which are substantial effects.
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practical advice to experimenters on when it is safe to stop collecting data to ensure the
orthogonality of the treatment to potential outcomes. Therefore, using training rounds to
detect unobserved heterogeneity remains a practical and viable alternative in the context of
experimental auctions.
4 Conclusion
Our results show the relevance of analyzing all available experimental data from exper-
imental auctions before making claims about the significance of treatment effects. In the
context of experimental auctions, we argue that data from training rounds could contain
valuable information that researchers most often dismiss.
Using a case study on the interplay of mood and projection bias in experimental auctions,
we demonstrate that data analysis from training rounds can help experimenters assess if there
is a failure of randomization to treatment and hence not fall prey to attributing a non-causal
effect as causal. When we analyze the data from the real auction, we detect significant
treatment effects that show that projection bias is mediated by mood. However, we found
that similar effects are present in the training rounds and products. Given that treatments
were applied only after the training rounds, we conclude that the effect we observe is not
due to assignment to treatment. The fundamental methodological problem we identify is
not limited to this experiment or auction experiments in general. It should be relevant for
all economics experiments that try to identify treatment effects.
As a further step in this research agenda, it would be interesting to collect auction datasets
from published papers for which data from the training rounds have been recorded and are
available. An analysis of data coming from the training rounds alongside the actual auction
results reported in the published papers would be a first step in redirecting the research
community from false avenues, if failures of randomization to treatment have indeed been
prevalent. Additionally, we only used one type of auction, a 2nd price auction, for our
experiment which by design may not produce strong enough incentives for all bidders to
reveal their true preferences. If inference mistakes interact with incentivization, then it
might be interesting in future studies to also examine and compare results from different
types of auctions that have been designed to engage off-margin bidders in larger group sizes
(like the random nth price auction; see for example Shogren et al., 2001).
For future auction experiments, we suggest that journal editors and reviewers ask authors
to report data and analysis from the training phase of experimental auctions. If authors find
significant treatment effects from their experiments, then these effects should not be present
in the training part of the auction, conditional on the treatments not taking place during
the training part of the auction study. All in all, we cannot stress enough the importance of
20
employing larger sample sizes in experiments to ensure success of randomization to treatment.
Since there might be a worry that this would lead to almost anything passing for statistically
significant, we should also stress the importance of complementing any analysis with effect
size calculations that would help in judging the economic significance of the treatment effects
(see for example Appendix D).
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A Appendix: Experimental Instructions
[This is an English translation of the original instructions written in Spanish]
[Text in brackets was not shown to subjects]
Welcome announcement
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this survey. The survey concerns the economics of
decision making.
In a short while, we will conduct a series of experimental auctions with known products.
You have been randomly assigned a participant number for this entire session. All
information collected is strictly confidential and will only be used for this specific project.
To thank you for your participation, you are going to be given 10e at the end of the
session. At the auction, you will have the opportunity to bid on and get the product,
which will be given to the highest bidders (according to the rules I will describe momentarily).
If you have any questions, you may ask an assistant or the moderator. Do not communicate
with other participants of this session.
In this experiment we explore several topics; therefore you will participate in several phases.
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The 2nd Price Vickrey Auction
In the tasks to follow you will participate in a type of auction known as a 2nd price auction.
The 2nd price auction has 5 basic steps:
Step 1: We’ll describe to you the product to be auctioned.
Step 2: Each one of you, will submit a bid for buying the product.
Step 3: The monitor will collect the bid sheets and rank all bids from highest to lowest.
Step 4: The person that submits a bid higher than the 2nd highest price buys the product
but will pay the price of the 2nd highest bidder. If your bid is not higher than
the second highest bid then you don’t purchase the good.
Consider this numerical example:
Suppose 8 people bid in an auction in order to buy a USB memory stick (16GB). Each
bidder submits a bid separately. The submitted bids are given in the table below:
1
Person Bid
1 12
2 15
3 20
4 18
5 30
6 25
7 35
8 0
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After ranking bids from highest to lowest, we have:
Person Bid
7 35
5 30
6 25
3 20
4 18
2 15
1 12
8 0
Persons 7 purchases one unit of the good because s/he bid higher than any other person
but only pays 30 (second highest bid). All the other participants in the auction pay nothing
and do not receive a memory stick.
In this auction, the best strategy is to bid exactly what the item is worth to you. Consider
the following: if you bid less than what the object is worth to you, then you may not buy
the product and miss a good opportunity for buying something at a price you were actually
willing to pay.
Conversely, if you bid more than what the object is worth to you, you may end up having
to pay a price higher than what you really wanted to. Thus, your best strategy is to bid
exactly what the object is worth to you. The tasks you will do today are not hypothetical
and have real monetary consequences.
Do you have any questions?
Page 3 out of 8
2
------Page break------
Training auction [Hypothetical: USB memory stick]
We will now do a training task. This task is designed to allow you to familiarize yourself
with the 2nd price auction. We will repeat this auction for three rounds. We will then select
one round as binding by having one of you selecting a number from 1 to 3 from an urn. The
numbers correspond to rounds, so if s/he picks number 1 then round 1 is binding, if s/he
picks number 2 then round 2 is binding etc. [It was emphasized to subjects that ‘binding’
in the hypothetical context of the practice auction was only meant to simulate the actual
auction to follow]
In this auction we will auction a memory stick. Take a look at this picture.
[Experimenter shows picture of usb memory stick in the screen]
You have all been provided with yellow slips, wherein you will write down and record your bid.
Please, take the yellow slip number 1 and write down the maximum you are willing to pay
to purchase this usb stick.
After you’ve finished writing your bids, the monitor will go around the room and collect the
bid sheets. I will then rank bids from highest to lowest, determine the 2nd highest price and
the person with bid above the 2nd highest price. In private, at the front of the room, bids
will be ranked from lowest to highest.
The bid is private information and should not be shared with anybody else. Please be quiet
while the auction is carried out.
[Once the first round is finished, second round starts]
Now, please, take the yellow slip number 2 and write down the maximum you are willing to
pay to purchase this usb stick.
[Same procedure is followed. Once the second round is finished, third round starts]
Now, please, take the yellow slip number 3 and write down the maximum you are willing to
pay to purchase this usb stick.
[Experimenter collects bid sheets]
[The experimenter asks one person to draw a number from an urn; Number determines
binding round]
[IDs of highest bidder and 2nd highest price for the binding round are determined and
announced]
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Picture evaluation phase [Mood inducement phase]
In this phase we will show you a sequence of 20 pictures.
You will see a slide with the number of the picture for 2 seconds, after it, each picture will
be shown on the screen for 6 seconds, and then you have 10 seconds to describe “how you
felt while watching the picture.” Please, look at the pictures carefully and keep quiet.
To describe how you felt, we have provided a scale with faces that you should use for ranking.
Please, make sure the number of the picture matches the number of scale used and tick the
appropriate box.
We remind you to please remain silent during the whole session.
Page 5 out of 8
------Page break------
Feelings evaluation [Mood measurement]
This question consists of a number of words and phrases that describe different feelings and
emotions. Read each item and then mark the appropriate answer in the space next to that
word.
Indicate to what extent you feel like this right now. Use the following scale to record your
answers:
[Original word in Spanish is provided in parenthesis]
very slightly/not at all a little moderately quite a bit extremely
1 2 3 4 5
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Interested (Motivado) Irritable (Irritable)
Upset (Molesto a disgusto) Alert (Alerta)
Excited (Emocionado) Ashamed (Avergonzado)
Distressed (De malas) Inspired (Inspirado)
Strong (Firme) Nervous (Nervioso)
Guilty (Culpable) Determined (Decidido)
Scared (Temeroso) Attentive (Estar atento)
Hostile (Agresivo) Jittery (Inquieto)
Enthusiastic (Entusiasmado) Active (Activo)
Proud (Estar orgulloso) Afraid (Inseguro)
The real product auctions
[Present auction treatment]
We will now auction a pen and a non-branded ham and cheese sandwich. The sandwiches
are kept in a refrigerator and have been bought this morning. We will follow the same
procedure as we did for the memory stick. We will repeat this auction for three rounds. We
will then select one round as binding by having one of you selecting a number from 1 to 3
from an urn. The numbers correspond to rounds, so if s/he picks number 1 then round 1
is binding, if s/he picks number 2 then round 2 is binding etc. Finally, we will select one
product as binding. We will select either 1 or 2 from an urn, being 1 the pen and 2 the ham
and cheese sandwich. Please, pass the sandwiches and the pens around.
Please, take the pink slip number 1 and write down the maximum you are willing to pay to
purchase the sandwich and the pen, respectively.
After you’ve finished writing your bids, the monitor will go around the room and collect
the bid sheets. The monitor will then rank bids from highest to lowest, determine the
2nd highest price and the person with bids above the 2nd highest price for each product,
respectively.
The bid is private information and should not be shared with anybody else. Please be quiet
while the auction is carried out.
[Once the first round is finished, second round starts]
Now, please, take the pink slip number 2 and write down the maximum you are willing to
pay to purchase the sandwich and the pen, respectively.
[Same procedure is followed. Once the second round is finished, third round starts]
Now, please, take the pink slip number 3 and write down the maximum you are willing to
pay to purchase the sandwich and the pen, respectively.
[Experimenter collects bid sheets]
5
[The experimenter asks one person to draw a number from an urn; Number determines
binding round. The experimenter asks one person to draw a number from an urn. The
number determines the binding product.]
[ID of highest bidder and 2nd highest price for the binding product and round are
determined and announced.]
[Future auction treatment]
We will now auction a pen and a non-branded ham and cheese sandwich. We will follow
the same procedure as we did for the memory stick. We will repeat this auction for three
rounds. We will then select one round as binding by having one of you selecting a number
from 1 to 3 from an urn. The numbers correspond to rounds, so if s/he picks number 1
then round 1 is binding, if s/he picks number 2 then round 2 is binding etc. Finally, we will
select one product as binding. We will select either 1 or 2 from an urn, being 1 the pen and
2 the ham and cheese sandwich. Please, pass the sandwiches and the pens around.
[Before lunch treatment]
The selected product will be given at 1 pm, in this exact place in one week from today. In
case the binding product is a sandwich, we will have available fresh sandwiches made on
the day of delivery. To ensure you get your pen or sandwich next week, you will be given
a coupon to be redeemed, and my own professional card, in case you have any problem
showing up. You can stop by my office to get the product in a weeks’ time, if for some
reason you are not able to pick it up from this room this time next week.
[After lunch treatment]
The selected product will be given at 3 pm, in this exact place in one week from today. In
case the binding product is a sandwich, we will have available fresh sandwiches made on
the day of delivery. To ensure you get your pen or sandwich next week, you will be given a
coupon to be redeemed, and my own professional card, in case you have any problem showing
up. You can stop by my office to get the product in a weeks’ time, if for some reason you
are not able to pick it up from this room this time next week.
[Common text for before and after lunch treatments]
However, you will have to pay for the product today when the session is finished. The
market price for the pen/sandwich determined from this auction (2nd highest price) will be
deducted from the participation fees of the highest bidders.
Are there any questions?
Please, take the pink slip number 1 and write down the maximum you are willing to pay to
purchase the sandwich and the pen, respectively.
6
After you’ve finished writing your bids, the monitor will go around the room and collect
the bid sheets. The monitor will then rank bids from highest to lowest, determine the
2nd highest price and the person with bid above the 2nd highest price for each product,
respectively.
The bid is private information and should not be shared with anybody else. Please be quiet
while the auction is carried out.
[Once the first round is finished, second round starts]
Now, please, take the pink slip number 2 and write down the maximum you are willing to
pay to purchase the sandwich and the pen, respectively.
[Same procedure is followed. Once the second round is finished, third round starts]
Now, please, take the pink slip number 3 and write down the maximum you are willing to
pay to purchase the sandwich and the pen, respectively.
[Experimenter collects bid sheets]
[The experimenter asks one person to draw a number from an urn; Number determines
binding round. The experimenter asks one person to draw a number from an urn. The
number determines the binding product.]
[ID of highest bidder and 2nd highest price for the binding product and round are
determined and announced.]
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Final questionnaire
The final task involves filling out a questionnaire. I will distribute the questionnaire in a
minute. Please make sure your ID number is on the top left corner and raise your hands
when you are done.
Thank you very much for your participation!
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B Appendix: Additional figures
Figure B.1: Kernel density estimators of picture evaluation scores by treatment
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C Appendix: Sample size calculations
Sample size calculations allow experimenters to establish conditions under which it is
possible to detect a certain (desirable) effect size with a specified power (Type II error).
Assuming α = 0.05 (Type I error) and β = 0.20 (Type II error), the per treatment minimum
sample size required to compare two means µ0 and µ1, with common variance of σ
2 in order
to achieve a power of at least 1−β is given by (Diggle et al., 2002, p. 30; Liu and Wu, 2005):
n =
2(z1−α/2 + z1−β)2(1 + (M − 1)ρ)
M(µ0−µ1
σ
)2
(A.1)
The formula above takes into account the fact that subjects submit multiple bids in our
experiment, by including the number of repeated measurements M (i.e., auction rounds in
our case) as well as a value for the correlation ρ between observations on the same subject.
To calculate a minimum sample size one needs to feed the above formula with values for σ,
M , ρ and the minimum meaningful difference µ0 − µ1.16
To specify the necessary parameters for the above formulas, we used data from an older
2nd price experiment for sandwich products conducted also with a Spanish student sample
(Briz et al., 2015). For this particular study, we calculated a value of σ = 0.55 and an
intraclass correlation coefficients of ρ = 0.83.
Consequently, we calculated the minimum sample size for a range of values of σ between
0.4 and 0.7 with a step of 0.1 and for three values of ρ (0.7, 0.8 and 0.9). As the minimum
meaningful difference, d = µ0 − µ1, we used values of 0.2 to 0.5 with steps of 0.05 which
matches well with the range of treatment effects reported in Tables 4 and 5.
Table C.1 shows sample size calculations for different values of σ, ρ and d. It is obvious
that the lower the minimum meaningful difference d, the higher the standard deviation σ and
the higher the correlation ρ, a larger sample size is needed to detect the desired effect size
with 80% power. Table C.1 highlights in gray all cases for which the per treatment sample
size of our experiment (32 subjects) is lower or equal than the corresponding calculation i.e.,
cases for which the sample size of the present study can detect as statistically significant
the minimum meaningful difference with 80% power. For the range of values of σ and ρ
considered here, our study cannot detect differences lower or equal to 0.2 with 80% power
but can safely detect any difference larger or equal to 0.5.
16The reader will note that in the special case where the experiment does not have multiple measurements
per subject, that is M = 1 and ρ = 0, the formula reduces to n =
2(z1−α/2+z1−β)
2
(
µ0−µ1
σ )
2
.
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Table C.1: Sample size calculations for different values of σ, ρ and d
σ = 0.4 σ = 0.5 σ = 0.6 σ = 0.7
d = 0.2
ρ = 0.7 50 78 113 154
ρ = 0.8 54 85 122 167
ρ = 0.9 59 92 132 179
d = 0.25
ρ = 0.7 32 50 72 98
ρ = 0.8 35 54 78 107
ρ = 0.9 38 59 84 115
d = 0.3
ρ = 0.7 22 35 50 68
ρ = 0.8 24 38 54 74
ρ = 0.9 26 41 59 80
d = 0.35
ρ = 0.7 16 26 37 50
ρ = 0.8 18 28 40 54
ρ = 0.9 19 30 43 59
d = 0.4
ρ = 0.7 13 20 28 38
ρ = 0.8 14 21 31 42
ρ = 0.9 15 23 33 45
d = 0.45
ρ = 0.7 10 16 22 30
ρ = 0.8 11 17 24 33
ρ = 0.9 12 18 26 35
d = 0.5
ρ = 0.7 8 13 18 25
ρ = 0.8 9 14 20 27
ρ = 0.9 9 15 21 29
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D Appendix: Cohen’s f 2
Standardized effect sizes can be important complements to statistical significance testing.
Although there is currently a menagerie of measures of effect sizes, these are often inappro-
priate for standardizing effects coming from more advanced econometric models, such as
random effect models employed in this paper, where variance accounted by different sources
must be accounted for (Selya et al., 2012). Cohen’s (1988) f 2, based on R2 values of different
versions of regression models, can circumvent the shortcomings of other standardized effect
size measures by employing a signal-to-noise ratio in the form of an F test:
F (u, v) =
PVS/u
PVE/v
(A.2)
where PVS is the source of the dependent’s variable Y variance accounted from some source,
PVE is proportion of error variance, u is the number of independent variables (IVs) for the
source i.e., the degrees of freedom for the numerator and v is the degrees of freedom for the
error variance. Cohen (1988) defines different formulas for F depending on how the source
and error are defined. The most general case, from which other cases can be derived as
special cases, assumes that the source of variance in Y comes from three different sources:
a set of variables A, B and C made up of k, m and n variables respectively. Using similar
notation to Cohen (1988), define the proportion of variance accounted for by a set of factors
A as R2Y ·A and the proportion of variance accounted for by A and B as R
2
Y ·A,B, then the
proportion of Y variance accounted for by B, over and above what is accounted for by A
is denoted as R2Y ·(B·A) = R
2
Y ·A,B − R2Y ·A. Given the additional set of variables C, the error
variance proportion is given by 1−R2Y ·A,B,C.
The F statistic in equation A.2 can be written as F (u, v) = f 2 v
u
where:
f 2 =
PVS
PVE
=
R2Y ·(B·A)
1−R2Y ·A,B,C
=
R2Y ·A,B −R2Y ·A
1−R2Y ·A,B,C
(A.3)
As a crude guide, Cohen (1988) offers conventional operational definitions of 0.02, 0.15
and 0.35 for ‘small’, ‘medium’ and ‘large’ values of f 2, respectively. These terms should not
be taken literally since the effects should be judged relative to the research field or to the
specific content being employed in any given investigation. In Cohen’s terminology large or
small effect sizes are not meant to classify treatment effects as ‘important’ or ‘not important’.
A ‘small’ effect size is to be interpreted as something that is really happening in the world
but which can only be seen through careful study. A ‘large’ effect size is an effect which
is big enough that can be spotted with a ‘naked observational eye’ (Cohen, 1988, pp. 13).
Cohen (1988) notes that ‘many effects sought in personality, social, and clinical-psychological
research are likely to be small effects.’
F (u, v) has a non-central F distribution with non-centrality parameter equal to λ =
f 2(u+v+1) (Cohen, 1988, pp. 414). In order to construct two-sided 100(1−α)% confidence
intervals (CIs) for λ given the sample F (u, v), one needs to find the non-centrality parameters
λlower and λupper that correspond to (Smithson, 2001):
Pr(u, v, F, λlower) = 1− a
2
(A.4)
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Pr(u, v, F, λupper) =
a
2
(A.5)
The recovered non-centrality parameters17 can be transformed back to the f 2 scale as
(Cohen, 1988, pp. 430):
f 2lower =
λlower
u+ v + 1
(A.6)
f 2upper =
λupper
u+ v + 1
(A.7)
Table D.2: Cohen’s f 2 and 95% Confidence intervals
Based on SB’s R21 Based on SB’s R
2
2
Variable f 2 95% CI f 2 95% CI
Positive Mood 0.008 0.000 0.029 0.008 0.000 0.030
Future at 1 pm 0.023 0.005 0.055 0.025 0.006 0.058
Future at 3 pm 0.001 0.000 0.013 0.001 0.000 0.014
Positive mood× Future at 1 pm 0.022 0.004 0.053 0.024 0.005 0.056
Positive mood× Future at 3 pm 0.012 0.001 0.036 0.012 0.001 0.038
Notes: Columns 2-4 show Cohen’s f2 and respective 95% confidence intervals based on Snijders
and Bosker’s (1999) level-1 R21. Columns 5-7 are based on Snijders and Bosker’s (1999) level-2
R22.
17For example, in Stata these can be calculated using the function nF(df1,df2,np,f).
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